Bouwsma did not meet Wittgenstein until 1949, and he had only the copy of The Blue Book that obtained from Alice Ambrose in 1939 on which to work. While The Blue Book was a great event in shaping Bouwsma`s thought, Bouwsma proceeded from a different history in coming to similar understanding of ``meaning is use`` as Wittgenstein. While Wittgenstein came to his later understanding of ``meaning as use`` by means of his early work with Russell in developing an ideal language, Bouwsma came to his understanding of ``meaning is use`` by way of his fascination with language Ð a love of words, poetry, literature, natural expression. Wittgenstein developed his understanding as he came to realize that our language could not be tamed and bridled by an imposed logical form. He realized that there is no science that describes the logic embedded in language. Bouwsma, by contrast, never thought there was. In his earliest notes, Bouwsma saw logic as a contrivance Ð as an invention. It cannot stand in judgment of itself as if it were a standard apart from our language.
G.E. Moore plays a role in their common background. While more complex than this, Moore`s relation to Wittgenstein might be understood through Wittgenstein`s remark in The Blue Book: ``There is no common sense answer to a philosophical problem. One can defend common sense against the attacks of philosopher`s only by solving their puzzles, i.e. by curing them of the temptation to attack common sense É`` Wittgenstein can be seen as providing a method of studying language-games as the necessary advancement on Moore`s merely restating common sense to skepticism.
Bouwsma too developed his understanding of ``meaning is use`` in relation to Moore. Moore attracted Bouwsma`s attention through Moore`s attacks on idealism a position Bouwsma held as a young philosopher. Bouwsma must have been attracted to Moore`s contrasting common sense claims over against the fantastic and skeptical claims of the idealist. Bouwsma, however, was never headed to a realist position as Moore was. When his philosophical awakening was in progress, as he acknowledges in a letter to Morris Lazerowitz, Bouwsma never regarded the realist position as a live option. So Moore`s proof of an external world and his identification of sense-data as intermediate entities between the external world and the perceiver were never a part of his attraction to Moore`s philosophy. Examining the early paper, ``Moore`s Theory of Sense-Data,`` shows a very different interest than this. There Bouwsma is interested in showing the importance of uncovering the analogies in our natural language that led to Morris` saying what he did about sense-data. Bouwsma later wrote of his work in that period paper that he was wandering in the dark with his instincts guiding him. He credits Wittgenstein with giving him light to see what he was doing in uncovering these possible language analogies embedded in Moore`s theory. The Moore paper was published around 1942, only three years after Bouwsma saw The Blue Book for the first time. He had not yet worked out for himself his understanding of it. His reactions to Moore`s work were based on his own skills and instincts. Wittgenstein and Bouwsma were working independently of each other in reacting to Moore, with different personal histories and interests in their attention to Moore`s philosophy. Yet they each shared the instinct that Moore`s ``common sense`` was in some way right-headed. Each sought a cure for the philosopher`s temptation to speak against common sense. While Bouwsma struggled in the dark and Wittgenstein provided the broader light that ``meaning is use`` sheds, it was Bouwsma who worked in the details of the language of the philosopher. Bouwsma showed by what means Ð by what misleading analogies Ð Moore was led to his theory of sense-data and realist metaphysics. Bouwsma would come to use this same technique of uncovering the embedded analogies in Moore`s own metaphysical views.
Although Bouwsma did not write on Frege in papers and notebooks, he knew Frege`s work in ``On Sense and Nominatum.`` Frege may be taken as presenting a starting point by means of which one might see something essential about Bouwsma`s development. Something essential of Wittgenstein`s development, too, can be seen from the same starting point in Frege. We do know of Wittgenstein`s attention to Frege Ð his visiting Frege as a young man and his references to him in the Philosophical Investigations. There are obvious connections in their thought. Bouwsma mentions in his journals that Wittgenstein discussed ``On Sense and Reference`` with Malcolm and others at Cornell. In that paper, the starting point is that the sense and the referent of referring terms are different. Further, Frege concludes, sense cannot be explained by identifying the referent of the term. Perhaps Frege did not have a full-blown understanding of the implication of the separate roots of sense or meaning. Perhaps Frege did not completely separate his founding of sense outside of the referent. Russell, in thinking through the issue of the referents of definite descriptions, sides with those who choose the referent base of meaning. Bouwsma and Wittgenstein, by contrast, choose to follow the lead of Frege to find meaning outside of the referent. Wittgenstein could be read as developing the whole of his later philosophy from Frege`s lead that sense is rooted independent of referents. And Bouwsma develops an understanding of ``meaning is use`` in essays and notebooks between 1939 and the 1950`s following that very lead in The Blue Book.
In Frege`s essay, ``On Sense and Reference,`` there is a fork in the understanding of language. Sense is assessed differently than truth. Truth may be a function of reference, but truth and reference cannot account for the sense of a sentence. To inform someone that Venus is the evening star is not to say that Venus is Venus. (Who would say, ``Venus is Venus``? It is difficult to imagine a context in which this would make sense.) But one who does not know the name of that bright star in the evening, might be enlightened by being told that it is Venus. It is not even a star, but a planet. The sense of ``Venus is the evening star`` is grasped in the context of one who did not know. Likewise, the sentence ``The morning star is the evening star,`` has the same referent as ``Venus is the evening star,`` but a different sense. While only one planet is the referent in both sentences, nevertheless the sentences have different uses.
So the fork in Frege separates sense and reference. If a philosopher follows the reference prong of the fork with the project of mapping our language in a symbolic language system, he will look for the referents of various parts of speech. Russell, for example, seeks referents for proper nouns and definite descriptions: Scott, the author of Waverly and the present king of England. A puzzle arises about such expressions as ``the present king of France.`` How are we to think of the meaning of a definite description that has no referent? And how are we to handle such definite descriptions that do not denote, when we predicate something of them, e.g. ``The present king of France is bald``? So Russell solves his problem by finding referents for definite descriptions, even when no such person as the present king of France exists. The person does not exist, but the concept does. The referent is the concept, though it has no instantiation Ð a null set. Meaning is saved. The expression has a referent. For Russell, the proposition is meaningful, but false.
If one, by contrast, follows the other prong in Frege`s fork, he looks for the sense of the sentence elsewhere than in reference. And where would that be? Frege is not clear. Perhaps he is still entangled in the idea that meaning lies in reference. But if pressed for the sense of a definite description, where would one look but to a contextual background? Frege, for example, says that ``Kepler discovered the elliptical orbit of the planets`` and ``The one who discovered the elliptical orbit of the planets died in abject poverty.`` The referent of ``Kepler`` and of ````the one who died in abject poverty`` is the same, and yet they mean something different. If one understands ``the one who died in abject poverty,`` he understands it as irony that Kepler was completely unknown at death, without friend or proper burial. To grasp the sense, we need to grasp something of the importance of Kepler`s discovery that for centuries the planets were thought to orbit in circles, that wealth and fame would come with such an important discovery, and that it is ironical that neither came to Kepler. Grasping all this and more is necessary for grasping the sense of the proposition. Merely identifying the referent denoted will not yield the sense. Taking this prong of Frege`s fork, leads to Wittgenstein`s full blown understanding of language: ``To understand a sentence is to understand a language.`` Frege, to be sure, did not come to this full blown understanding. Maybe he did not fully take the sense fork himself, but the seed of the understanding is there.
Bouwsma`s essay ``What Is Meaning?`` is a part of the sustained effort he made to understand the issues of The Blue Book and connects directly with Frege`s fork and Russell`s definite descriptions. He raises a form of the opening question of The Blue Book Ð ``What is the meaning of a word?`` Ð and explores it. Looking for the meaning may be like a man trying to understand the expression ``a bull in a China shop,`` by looking for a bull in a China shop. The result of misunderstanding the meaning of ``meaning`` is comparable to misunderstanding the metaphor of the bull. And where now is the bull? It must be invisible, hidden. In the essay, Bouwsma explores analogies that give rise to the picture that meaning is invisible and hidden away in a mind. Of course, meaning is not found in some invisible object (a concept)either.
Bouwsma goes on in the essay to compare the questions ``What is the meaning of `ptarmigan`?`` to ``What is the meaning of `the King of Swat`?`` Philosophers, including Wittgenstein, at this time, were aware of the interests of Frege and Russell in developing an ideal language. Bouwsma, in coming to his understanding of ``meaning,`` followed the Frege-Wittgenstein prong rather than the Russell prong of the fork.
``The King of Swat`` is what Russell calls a ``definite description.`` It denotes something and therefore, according to Russell can be used in meaningful propositions: ``The King of Swat is pudgie``; ``The King of Swat hit thirty-five homeruns last season.`` Russell goes on to generate a puzzle for himself when he wonders what to do with definite descriptions that do not denote anything, such as ``The present King of France.`` What are we to say about meaning when we predicate ``is bald`` to a nonentity? Russell says, nevertheless, that we can do this. We can mean something when we say, ``The present king of France is bald.`` We have said something false, however, as there is presently no king of France.
Bouwsma first plays with ``What is a ptarmigan?``. How would we explain the meaning to someone? A ptarmigan is a bird. This helps. It gives us the right category in which to place ``ptarmigan.`` The grammar of ``ptarmigan`` will follow the grammatical patterns of birds. That, is we can say of ptarmigans what we can say of birds. A trip to the zoo or the library to find a bird book might be helpful too. ``There is a ptarmigan,`` pointing to the bird in the cage or on the page, will accomplish something. But if we are not asking for help with a word that we do not understand, but are asking the philosophical question (``What is meaning?``), what sort of thing is the meaning that the word denotes? And if we are now directed by finger to the bird in the cage as the meaning, we find ourselves confused: What is the meaning? Ð a bird. Where is the meaning? Ð in a cage. Bouwsma wants us to hear this as odd. We ask for meaning and we are presented with a bird. So now one corrects us with the explanation that it is the idea of the ptarmigan and not the ptarmigan itself that is the meaning. And, further, the idea of ptarmigan is in one`s mind. Meanings are in the minds. Referents are in minds. And it is the referent in the mind that is the meaning. Still, this is odd. We ask for the meaning and are given not feathers but the idea of feathers. Even in the concept and image of ``ptarmigan,`` we do not yet have it used in a sentence. ``Yet, ``ptarmigan`` is simple in comparison to the definite description, ``the King of Swat.`` Both are supposed to mean by denoting a referent. Point to the referent and you have pointed to the meaning. The oddness of presenting the meaning of ``ptarmigan`` carries over to ``the King of Swat.`` But the King of Swat`` is more complex. Understanding ``swat`` and ``king`` are involved in the expression. Merely pointing to the referent or a picture or a picture of the referent will not explain ``the King of Swat.`` Pointing to the pudgie man in the picture or rounding the bases in an old film will not explain ``the King of Swat.`` ``The King of Swat is pudgie,`` does not get the mission accomplished and neither does identifying Babe Ruth as ``the King of Swat.`` ``Venus is the morning star`` and ``Babe Ruth is the King of Swat`` both exhibit Frege`s point that sense cannot be explained merely by referent. ``Babe Ruth`` and ``the King of Swat`` each refer to Babe Ruth. But ``the King of Swat`` can only be understood in the context of baseball. It says at once that Ruth is the batting champion, at the top of the list of the best batters in baseball, a name recognized as hero wherever there are baseball fans.
In two separate essays, Bouwsma seems to ask and answer the question: ``What is meaning?`` The answer in the second essay is: ``Meaning is use.`` But this account of the essays as asking and answering is superficial. In the question-asking essay, it is the question that is under examination. In each case respectively, Bouwsma is uneasy about the question and answer.
Consider the reasons for uneasiness over the question, ``What is meaning?`` Remember Wittgenstein`s uneasiness over the question in the beginning passages of The Blue Book when he shifts the question ``What is the meaning of a word?`` to ``How do we explain the meaning of a word?`` There are various ways to explain the meaning of a word. These may vary too depending on which word we are explaining. Why is it better to replace the question, ``What is the meaning of a word?`` with ``How do we explain the meaning?`` The latter is more concrete. It is something we know the answer to, because we have had to explain a word to someone on many occasions. By contrast, ``What is the meaning of a word?`` is more abstract. It asks, not for the meaning of some particular word, but for the meaning of any and every word. It asks a conceptual question about meaning: What is meaning?
``What is meaning?`` has the form of the basic conceptual question that philosophers ask: ``What is . . . ?`` What is the essential idea or concept that a given word of interest to the philosopher denotes? ``What is virtue?`` Socrates asks and then directs: Do not tell me of its various uses, but tell me what is common, and thereby essential, to its various uses. If the uses of virtue are put in front of us and are thereby apparent, what is it that is not in front of us and not thereby apparent? What is it that is not in front of us, but behind the appearances of the word? So philosophy might be characterized as the activity that asks for the hidden reality behind the apparent uses of a word. What is virtue? What is justice? What is mind? What is time? What is knowledge? And now we have: What is meaning? And its equivalent form: What is the meaning of the word ``meaning``?
This question is not to be taken for the question: How do we explain the word ``meaning``? Allow the digression: For whom and on what occasion would we explain the word ``meaning``? Philosophers aside, one is at a loss to say. Children do not ask for the meaning of the word ``meaning.`` And it is not an unfamiliar word to people who speak the English language. Perhaps someone learning English as a second language might come across the word ``meaning`` in a translation assignment. This might trigger the question, but remember it is not the philosopher`s question: What is meaning? The philosopher is asking for the hidden essential reality called ``meaning`` Ð the meaning that lies behind the word. The word is a sign Ð a sign for what? The word is a dead set of sounds or marks. The word comes to life Ð is besouled by Ð the meaning that it has. The meaning accompanies the word like a soul accompanies a body. And that is the meaning of the philosopher`s question. What is it? What gives words life? Where does the meaning reside? It is not in the sound or the mark. Meaning must be in the mind. The meaning is the only appropriate place for a meaning to take up residency. Further, meanings must be in multiple minds, as communication between people requires relying on commonly shared meanings. So meaning is puzzling and illusive, because it will not hold still for examination. It is not like examining how ink and sound waves are produced and received. These inquiries into the nature and composition of ink and sound are empirical inquiries. The inquiry into meaning is more exhalted and, at the same time, more puzzling and unsettling. It is, of course, a conceptual investigation unlike the other empirical investigations. Conceptual investigations are about words and word usages. In the instance of studying the concept of meaning, then, we are conceptually investigating conceptual investigations. We are, that is, asking for the meaning of the word ``meaning.`` Whatever difficulties accompany conceptual investigations would apparently accompany this investigation twice Ð once in asking, ``What is the meaning of a word?`` and secondly in asking the question of itself, ``What is the meaning of `meaning`?`` No wonder Bouwsma intended to exhibit uneasiness about the question.
Bouwsma consistently worked on this question ``What is the meaning of a word?`` showing that it is a mis-asked question. It calls for the one element Ð the one thread Ð that runs through all the uses of a word. Such a thread must be present to justify the word`s use in each case. But what is this like? What analogous investigation into a word leads one to ask for the common element? So Bouwsma uncovers analogies relevant to the temptation to ask: ``What is . . . ?`` And what is wrong with asking that? Is it that unlike ``What is a triangle?``, there is no single thread that runs through all instances of ``time``? No, there are many threads, and Bouwsma pulls on them to show the differences between them. ``Time runners in a race,`` ``time flies,`` Bouwsma taps out the music of the uses of ``time`` in ¾ time. ``I`ll show you differences`` Ð and Bouwsma does. Bouwsma shows the differences in the usage where the question made it look as if there were no significant differences.
So too with the metaphysical investigation: What is meaning? This comes to: What is the meaning of the word ``meaning``? In fact, there are different uses and not necessarily one criterion for the use of ``meaning.`` And ``What is meaning?`` is not to be confused with ``How do we explain the meaning of a word to someone?`` This can readily be done in several ways. Nor is the question to be confused with: How do we explain the meaning of the word ``meaning`` to a German speaker? ```Bedeutung.` It is translated as `Bedeutung` in German.`` No. These questions are not what is asked. What is asked is esoteric and elusive. One feels this more pointedly when the questions that are not being asked are set over against it. ``What is meaning?`` is asking for the general account of the life behind the sound or the word on the page.
Bouwsma is a philosopher and as a philosopher he has interest in language. This involves the issue of meaning. How does language mean? In Bouwsma`s time, there is a keen interest in the question. Logicians such as Frege and Russell pursued the question of meaning through their project of crafting a symbolic language that would show precisely the logical structure of our natural language. In their pursuit of this project they found it necessary to sort out the categories of reference, truth, and meaning as these these categories relate to propositions. Bouwsma, of course, knew the works of these men and felt the pinch of developing clarity on the categories of reference, truth, and meaning. I might add too that Bouwsma had a natural affinity for reflecting on language, which is to say that he was attentive to the meaning of words and expressions. He enjoyed word play, and he enjoyed certain kinds of nonsense that could be produced by playing with sense. His aptitude for comedy rested on his ability to turn sense to nonsense in a flash. Notwithstanding his natural propensity for language, he is a philosopher, with philosophers surrounding him. Accordingly he took an interest in the issue of meaning, and asked as a philosopher: What is meaning? He was stirred under the power of that question. But the uniqueness of his work as a philosopher was that he not only asked the question and felt the puzzlement of it, but he reflected on the question itself. He asked not simply ``What is meaning?``, but ``What am I asking when I ask that question? Is the question itself the right question? What does the question mean? Is it asking for an essence when there is no essence? Is it ignoring all the cases where we explain the meaning of a word and look for a vague and abstract concept of meaning that floats above all words in general? Does it, the question, presuppose that meaning accompanies words? Does it presuppose that meanings are thoughts in minds? Bouwsma, of course, is stirred by the question, but instead of offering an answer, he presses on the question itself.
In the second essay, ``Failure II: Meaning Is Use,`` Bouwsma puts Wittgenstein`s answer under scrutiny, just as he did ``What is meaning?` Wittgenstein`s sentence from Philosophical Investigations #43 is laid on the examination table. ``For a large class of cases though not for all we may define meaning as use.`` ``Define` is the wrong translation for ``erklaren.`` It would be better to translate ``erklaren`` as ``explain the meaning`` or ``make clear the meaning.`` What is at stake here is the possible misunderstanding of interpreting Wittgenstein as giving a definition of ``meaning.`` After Wittgenstein takes pains to show that there need not be an essence or common element running through all cases of the use of a word, it would be a blunder to say that ``meaning is defined as the use of a word.`` ``To make clear the meaning`` is what Wittgenstein intends. This expression fits precisely with the beginning of The Blue Book where, when asking the question ``What is the meaning of a word?``, Wittgenstein says that it would be better if we remind ourselves of how we explain the meaning of a word. This project is manageable, and it shows us what is important to ask about meaning; namely, that meaning is often explained by providing the uses of a word.
As Bouwsma starts his analysis of ``meaning is use,`` he gives heed to Wittgenstein`s advice that we ask for the use of the expression. But here we notice immediately that it does not have an ordinary use. The expression is given in answer to the philosophical question: ``What is meaning?`` So the answer is a generalization reflecting on the concepts of meaning and of language. We may call such reflective remarks describing the ways in which we use words in our language ``grammatical remarks.`` Grammatical remarks describe the ways in which we use words in our language.
The primary description of the use of the word ``meaning`` is that we give the use of a word when we want to explain its meaning. If, for example, we come across a word in our reading that we do not know, we may look it up in a dictionary. There we find the way the word is used. Bouwsma, in reading Tolstoi, came across the word ``izba``: ``I must clean up the izba against the holidays.`` The dictionary then says that an izba is the loghouse of a Russian peasant. And now one understands that the word ``izba`` is used in the same way as ``the loghouse of a Russian peasant`` is used. Meaning is use. Notice that it is assumed that one already understands how ``the loghouse of a Russian peasant`` is used before one can understand ``izba.``
It is important in understanding the meaning of ``meaning is use`` to consider the occasion in which one asks for the meaning of a word. One such occasion is noted above: 1) Coming across a new word, when reading,. Other occasions are: 2) Someone who respects our mastery of vocabulary asks: What does ``odious`` mean? 3) A child learning a language asks for the meaning of a word. 4) A foreigner asks what a word in English means or how to translate that word into his own language. There are others as well. Providing the use is a generalization about our responses in these and similar situations when the meaning is asked for. Providing a synonym or synonyms, for example, maybe just the right explanation for the meaning of a word. ``Odious`` means ``bad`` or ``offensive.`` ``Effete`` means ``ineffective.`` Giving a synonym is meant to give another word that can be used in the same way as the word in question. The synonym is supposed to have the same use, but as it is a different word, it often has a similar but not identical use. ``Rancorous`` and ``venomous`` are not really identical, nor are ``effete`` and ``ineffective.`` We need more to explain the meaning.
Another common way of explaining the meaning of a word is by ostensive definition Ð by pointing to something as an example or an instance of the use of the word in question. One can explain ``ptarmigan`` by pointing to a bird in a cage in the aviary and ``orchid`` by pointing to a flower. The pointing may not look at first, as if it is connected to use. But remember that seeing the ptarmigan as a bird and the orchid as a flower tells us that one may say many of the same things about ptarmigan that one can about birds. The uses of ``ptarmigan`` are closely connected with those of ``bird.`` And distinguishing the uses of ``ptarmigan`` from ``cockatoo`` and ``parrot`` will be an important part of the explanation of the meaning of ``ptarmigan.``
We should remember in all of these cases, that in order to grasp the explanation of the meaning of a word, we must have a significant command of the language in which we ask the question. We must, that is, already have a command of the uses and grammars of many words in order to receive the explanation of the meaning of a single word. For ``izba,`` we must know how to use the words ``the log house of a Russian peasant.`` For ``effete,`` we must know the use of ``ineffective,`` ``weak,`` and ``useless.`` For ``ptarmigan`` and ``orchid,`` we must be fluent, as we are, with ``birds```` and ``flowers.`` ``Meaning is use`` reverberates back through the language that is already in place.
``Meaning is use,`` then is a grammatical remark: It describes the ways in which we explain the meanings of words. As a grammatical remark, the expression itself has no use. Bouwsma points out that the grammatical remark ``Meaning is use`` is a corrective description for another grammatical remark meant to account for meaning. That other grammatical remark is ``Meaning is referent.`` That is: ``The meaning of a word is the object to which the word refers.`` This grammatical description has haunted philosophers who would account for meaning as well as those who have not sought an explanation of meaning but have, nevertheless, operated under the spell of this picture. The meaning of ``izba,`` ``ptarmigan,`` and ``orchid`` are the objects referred to or designated by the words. If the log house in the field, the bird in the cage, and the orchid in the flower pot do not seem appropriate objects for meanings, then the idea of these objects is the object. The idea becomes the object. Meanings are ideas in the heads of speakers who put out sound waves and ink marks. But the meanings are thoughts not sound waves and not marks. Bouwsma provides pictures and analogies of meaning that fit with the standard account or presupposition that ``Meaning is the referent.``
So ``Meaning is use`` is meant as a corrective to ``Meaning is the referent.`` Both should be understood as grammatical remarks. Both should be understood as what philosophers have done with the question of meaning. Both have their difficulties. ``Meaning is use`` is operative Ð it works as an account of how we give an account of the meaning of words. It should not be regarded as a definition of ``meaning,`` for then it would draw us into the picture that the idea of meaning that is defined is the object to which the word ``meaning`` refers. The grammatical remark that ``meaning is the referent`` misunderstands the concept of meaning. And, in so far as it brings in a referent to explain the idea of the meaning of a word, it does not go far enough. Identifying the referent of a word merely prepares one for the use of the word. It does not explain the meaning, and is not the meaning itself. That I know what the words ``red`` and ``ptarmigan`` refer to only sets up a connection so that I can use and mean something by these words in yet unformed sentences. Bouwsma draws out the nonsense of confusing meaning with referents by such playful stories as: ``The housewife scolds the garbage man for spilling garbage, lettuce leaves, and egg shells on the drive way. He looks at her and asks, `Lady, what are you referring to?` And she points to the lettuce leaves and egg shells and says, `Lady, I have got the referents,` smiles and walks off to his truck.`` The referents still lay in the driveway. Bouwsma teases: How many referents are there in: ``Oh what a rogue and peasant slave am I?`` The upshot of Bouwsma`s comparison of the grammatical remarks ``Meaning is use`` and ``Meaning is the referent`` is that we must be cautious with understanding ``Meaning is use,`` but we cannot understand ``Meaning is the referent.``
The need for caution may be further emphasized with the analogy of ``What is the use of a nut?`` which is comparable to ``What is the use of a word?`` A word like a nut has many uses. Nuts are used in automobiles, high-rise buildings, roller, skates, and washing machines. They also grow on trees, although this might be better thought of as a different word. Likewise a word has different uses in different contexts. So we might want to focus on those contexts to see how the word is used in a specific context, if we should want to say what the word meant. It is true that there are similarities and overlaps in the meanings. But it is also true that we should be cautious about saying that the word has a meaning, as if there were a meaning of word.