RYLE AND BOUWSMA AT RICE

A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RYLE AND WITTGENSTEIN

In April of 1972, Gilbert Ryle spent three weeks in Houston, Texas lecturing and discussing his philosophy on the campus of Rice University. He came at the invitation of Konstantin Kolenda, who invited philosophers related to Ryle`s work. Bouwsma was among them. Bouwsma had known Ryle since at least 1950 when Ryle had asked Bouwsma to deliver the John Locke lectures inplace of Wittgenstein, who had turned down the invitation. Bouwsma was well aquainted with Ryle and Ryle`s Concept of Mind by 1972.

In a symposium during Ryle`s extended visit to Rice, Bouwsma presented a paper with the title ``A Difference Between Ryle and Wittgenstein.`` By reports of those present, Ryle was upset with Bouwsma`s remarks characterizing Wittgenstein as one who did not presents arguments in philosophy, but as one who aimed at bringing relief to an ailing philosopher. Bouwsma compared Wittgenstein`s work to psychoanalysis as opposed to Ryle`s work that aimed at the refutation of the Cartesian theory of mind. While Ryle wanted to show a theory false, Wittgenstein wanted to aid the philosopher ensnarled in the language of mind to an awareness of the grammatical analogies that kept him in the tangle.

When Ryle was given the opportunity to reply to any of the papers in writing, he chose only Bouwsma`s to take issue with. He categorized Bouwsma`s reading of Wittgenstein as idiosyncratic: ``Like us, Bouwsma has his own Wittgenstein.`` He downplayed the comparison that Wittgenstein himself made of his work to psychoanalysis. Unlike Bouwsma`s claim that Wittgenstein ``sought to bring relief, control, calm, quiet, peace, release …,`` Ryle characterizes Wittgenstein as arousing in us ``interest, fascination, excitement, anger, shock.`` And counter to Bouwsma`s claim that Wittgenstein does not argue,Ryle, in astonishment says, ``What about these …`` citing numerous arguments from the Philosophical Investigations, and even suggesting that Wittgenstein was engaged with refuting theories.

Bouwsma`s paper, ``A Difference Between Ryle and Wittgenstein`` presents Wittgenstein as making a radical break with philosophy as usually practiced. Ryle is portrayed as one in the traditional camp of philosophers who refute and propose theories. Ryle claims that the Cartesian theory of mind holds certain basic propositions as true. But they are not true. They are false propositions based on a mistake – a category mistake conflating minds with bodies. Wittgenstein, by contrast, does not present theories, propositions, nor arguments. Wittgenstein attends, rather, to the language that entangles us and draws us into theory making. Wittgenstein is concerned with the hidden analogy in our language that misleads us into such theory making. The hidden analogy – hidden by ````surface grammar`` – is uncovered by the deeper probing of grammar that reveals differences as opposed to the surface similarities, which coax forth certain pictures and ultimately theories. This depth probing may be compared to something like what the psychoanalyst does. A further comparison to psychoanalysis is the relief, the peace, etc., at which the psychoanalyst aims in uncovering repressed, painful thoughts. Likewise, the practitioners of Wittgenstein`s method uncover the hidden analogies giving rise to the philosophical discomfiture. These contrasting pictures of the task and practice of philosophy form the essence of Bouwsma`s remarks in his paper. The contrast to Ryle is not so much intended as a criticism of Ryle, as an opportunity for Bouwsma to advance his insight to the reading of Wittgenstein that is so easily missed and demonstrated in Ryle`s reading.

In addition to these brief remarks in his paper, Bouwsma spent at least three months before the conference and several months afterwards writing out his thoughts on this difference in his commonplace book. He worked through the Concept of Mind again. He found a remark by Ryle in an autobiographical sketch to the effect that he, as a young man, had on occasions attended meetings of the Moral Sciences Club at Cambridge and was caught up in the excitement of Wittgenstein`s work. But Ryle was put off by the jeering of Wittgenstein`s followers at the mention of other classical philosophers. It was suggested that one who thought the thoughts of other philosophers was not a real philosopher, but an academic. Bouwsma explores this at length in his notes. It was not a matter of whether Wittgenstein read or cared to read Plato and Descartes, etc., but rather what the place of reading other philosophers is in doing philosophy. Bouwsma`s exploration of this issue here is valuable quite apart from whatever Ryle and Wittgenstein`s views on the matter were. It shows Bouwsma`s appreciation for the genius of these historical figures and the depth of their entanglements in the very language that entangles anyone who takes up philosophy. They are studied not as history but as geniuses caught up in the ensnarling language of philosophy. Bouwsma also remembers the spirit of the times when Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge to practice philosophy and what it was like for the young Ryle or anyone to be in Wittgenstein`s presence. In a fine piece of story telling, he compares the young Ryle to Hippocrates wanting to study with Protagoras. And what would the benefit be? – Perhaps he thought that everything would be changed, that he would be better somehow, and that he could learn to see things through new eyes. Ryle had hopes, but did such changes occur or was there merely a new theory through which past philosophy would now be interpreted?

These notes covering periods surrounding Bouwsma`s exchanges with Ryle, present an excellent and insightful picture of Wittgenstein`s understanding of the nature of philosophy`s task. The notes assess the failure of philosophy to arrive at settled conclusions as the failure to adequately examine the language at the sources of philosophical problems. Philosophy`s new task now involves comparing the language of philosophical problems with the same language used outside of philosophy. This involves noticing previously unnoticed analogies that can now be drawn between the two. Such comparisons will reveal the ways in which a philosopher may come to his theories. Nonsense is shown, not proven, but shown. What had passed for sense is, by means of recalling a word`s actual use, now exposed as nonsense. This has not been done by arguments, but by means of comparison of expressions. Bouwsma presents this insight into Wittgenstein`s work. He presents it in striking contrast to Ryle`s work in order to drive home a point hard. While Ryle refutes a theory, Wittgenstein displays it as nonsense. In Ryle there are arguments and theories and refutations of theories. In Wittgenstein there are no arguments, no refutations, and no theories. Does this mean that one can find neither argument nor some part of a theory under examination in the Philosophical Investigations? Of course one can find such things. But one will miss the center of what Wittgenstein is doing if one supposes that he is offering arguments in refutation of a theory of mind. Ryle was right to respond to Bouwsma that Bouwsma has his own understanding of Wittgenstein. It was a hard-earned understanding that penetrated the indirect dialogue Wittgenstein constructed in the Philosophical Investigations. That dialogue form was calculated to draw the reader through his own probing of the language in which a philosophical problem is cast. These notes provide a great insight into the reading of Wittgenstein`s book and are among the best writings attempting to help a reader see its depth.

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