REFLECTIONS ON JOHN COOK`S

WITTGENSTEIN`S METAPHYSICS

John Cook has written a book with the surprising title Wittgenstein`s Metaphysics. He acknowledges that he is offering a non-standard interpretation of `Wittgenstein in which he argues that Wittgenstein indeed has a metaphysical theory and that he maintained it consistently throughout his writings. The primary features of the theory are that Wittgenstein was, through the primary influence of Schopenhauer but linked to Berkeley and Hume, a phenomenalist, and that like Russell and James he held the view known as neutral monism. The title Wittgenstein`s Metaphysics and the claim that Wittgenstein held these theories are surprising to me because I and others have not read Wittgenstein in this way and because Wittgenstein himself never lays claims to these views.

Cook has become an impressive scholar of Wittgenstein`s work. He has read and re-read the main works of Wittgenstein and poured over his lecture notes, minor writings, and the writings and remarks of other students and other scholars. This scholarship is, in my judgment, at the root of Cook`s misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. It is a misunderstanding to read him as a neutral monist and phenomenalist, but it is a more serious misunderstanding to read him as putting forward a metaphysical theory. It has been Wittgenstein`s struggle to say what has gone wrong with metaphysical theories that marks his distinction and originality as a philosopher. Showing the fly the way out of the fly-bottle, noting what happens when language goes on a holiday, destroying houses of cards, exposing disguised nonsense as patent nonsense, etc., are not the remarks of one satisfied with the results of metaphysics. Cook, however, has, in his own view, managed to penetrate this self deception of Wittgenstein and revealed the true metaphysical nature of the supposed paramount anti-metaphysical terrorist. Such a colossal misreading may, as I am suggesting, come from being a scholar where being a scholar is inappropriate. A scholar searches for the views of his subject, interpreting and explaining those views to others. In that mode, Wittgenstein has views or theories, even metaphysical theories. There are questions and puzzles that arise in Wittgenstein`s writings, such as: What is Wittgenstein saying about the metaphysical self in the Tractatus? and: What happens to Wittgenstein`s views on the self as we move to the Blue Book and the Philosophical Investigations? etc. And so, Cook offers a scholar`s account: The views are consistent, even the same, in all three books. In the books, Wittgenstein puts forward put forward the views of neutral monism and phenomenalism which he inherited from his various mentors.

I do not understand neutral monism -- a neutral something, neither mental nor physical. While I can explain phenomenalism to my students, saying all the right words and having them say them back, I do not understand phenomenalism either. I, for sure, do not understand how Wittgenstein can be said to hold the theory of phenomenalism, as I at least am able to understand the words of phenomenalism. And finally, though I can follow with interest an account of Wittgenstein`s various remarks about ``I,`` I do not understand how these amount to the metaphysical theory of neutral monism. There is much here that I do not understand, so much so that I have despaired of ever coming to understand it.

I do however want to try to understand how Cook might have come to say these things. Cook was a student of O.K.Bouwsma. Cook has been a reader of Wittgenstein with insight. In part, because of Cook`s earlier work on Wittgenstein, I can better explain why Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist. How then could he come to write this book about Wittgenstein having a metaphysics? There is something seductive about his misunderstanding, and I believe that uncovering it will help in the understanding of Wittgenstein. In trying to understand the roots of Cook`s misunderstanding, I must beg off examining the words of Cook`s book closely. In fact, when I read the book with attention, I find it engaging, well written, and almost persuasive. What I will do then is to try to think like Cook -- try to think my way into seeing Wittgenstein as a neutral monist and try to understand what the misunderstanding of Wittgenstein is. In this task there may be some glimpse of Wittgenstein that is worth the effort.

Here is a gross view of the issue. It is clear that Wittgenstein is attempting to dispel the enchantment of Cartesian dualism. In Cartesian dualism, Descartes may be taken to be asking the question: What is ``I`` the name of? And Descartes, after rejecting the answer that ``I`` names his body, puts forward the answer that ``I`` is the name of the thinking substance which is the one that has my thoughts, sensations, beliefs, pains, etc. ``I and only I am the one who has my experiences.`` Now Wittgenstein, through his myriad of thought projects, works away at dispelling the confusions holding us captive by this view. By commanding a clear view of language, one might be released from the captivity of the mental substance theory of mind -- one might come to see that ``I`` is not the name of a thinking thing -- a res cogitans.

Many contemporary philosophers, having taken in the spirit of the age that the mental substance theory is false, have come to hold some version of the only theory that seems to be left: the material substance theory. Under this view, ``I`` becomes the name of a material substance -- a res extensa. A quick glance at Wittgenstein or perhaps hearing a few lectures on him might well lead one to conclude that he was an early proponent of this material substance view. In this glance, he and his student Gilbert Ryle would be ``revolutionary philosophers`` in overturning the mental substance theory and would be pioneers in the new ``cognitive science`` which rests on the foundation of the material theory of mind. But Cook knows that this is a misreading of Wittgenstein. Cook knows that ``I`` for Wittgenstein, is not the name of a body nor central nervous system nor collection of bodily behavior. He knows that Wittgenstein does not hold a material substance theory.

So where does this leave Cook? ``I`` is neither the name of a mental stuff nor a material stuff. What then does Wittgenstein think the ``I`` is? What is his view of the self? There are passages, opaque yet fascinating, in the Tractatus, Blue Book, Philosophical Investigations, and more, where Wittgenstein discusses ``I.`` In the Tractatus, the I disappears into the propositions it has proposed -- the world having already disappeared into those same propositions. ``I am my world.`` ``For what the solipsist means is quite correct . . .`` ``. . . the limits of language . . . mean the limits of my world.`` In the Blue Book, speaking and thinking are one. Mental states are not necessary and are shaved off by Ockham`s razor, leaving everyday discourse as the source of understanding meaning. Wittgenstein can ``give us no agent that thinks.`` There are only words, words, words. Pain does not necessarily belong to one particular agent, as if it could be only mine -- nothing necessarily links my pain to me. ``I am in pain,`` is not used to refer to me; it is a groan. Here, and in the Philosophical Investigations, the analysis of various concepts such as belief, expectation, understanding, meaning, recognition, etc., is done by removing the mysterious mental cloud surrounding those concepts, and one is left without consciousness as the medium by which language conveys its meaning from head to head.

From such ideas Cook begins, it seems, to form an answer to the question: What is Wittgenstein`s view of the self? To Cook, Wittgenstein`s theory of the self is that the self is all the middle stuff between I and the world. The middle stuff -- the neutral stuff -- is the collection of the language, sights and sounds, pain, and all that mental medium and world are reduced to. ``I`` becomes the name of that which is left over after consciousness and world are subtracted. The metaphysics of idealism and realism collapse into the metaphysics of neutral monism. Cook then reads Wittgenstein to be saying that this middle stuff is phenomena.

Here Cook forces the reading beyond my ability to follow. Hume is read into his understanding of Wittgenstein. Cook takes Hume`s and Wittgenstein`s understanding of causality to be the same. Both are ``acausal`` -- there is no discoverable connection between events, only the repeated phenomena which logic cannot guarantee. I cannot follow Cook through this mashing of Wittgenstein`s words to arrive at phenomenalism. I am struck though by the similarity of Hume`s view of the self, perceptions, and the world to Cook`s reading of Wittgenstein on neutral monism. As Hume can find no agent but only a bundle of perceptions -- phenomena in the middle -- present at any moment, Cook reads Wittgenstein in the same way. Phenomena are all that exist -- Hume`s metaphysics. So too, phenomena, or what Cook reduces to phenomena, are all that exist for Cook`s Wittgenstein -- Wittgenstein`s metaphysics. ``I,`` then, has again become the name of something -- of this middle stuff. Though Wittgenstein does not acknowledge that he has this metaphysic, Cook sees this as hypocritical on Wittgenstein`s part.

This perhaps is a gross account of how Cook came to his view of Wittgenstein. I do not have the patience for examining the detail of Cook`s reading of individual passages and remarks of Wittgenstein. They seem forced and unlikely readings to me. What does interest me is the task of how to read Wittgenstein over against Cook`s misunderstanding that Wittgenstein has a metaphysics of neutral monism -- that ``I`` is the name of a middle stuff bundle of activities. Surely the ghost of the notion that the meaning of a word is a mental referent is still at work in Cook`s mind. Is Cook still entertaining the question: What is the meaning of ``I``? Has he not asked for the use of ``I`` instead the meaning of ``I``?

Here is a productive exercise from Wittgenstein (PI #404): In saying ``I am in pain,`` one is not naming a person. The use of the expression ``I am in pain`` is like that of a groan. ``I`` here is not functioning as a name, but the whole expression is being used as an expression of pain. This noticing of use in place of supposing that ``I`` is a referent is generally enlightening -- has general application. Consider other uses of the first person: i) ``I see a light over there.`` -- This may be a recommendation to go in a certain direction when lost on a dark night. ii) ``I wish you had not done that.`` -- a complaint. iii) ``I heard something.`` -- an alarm. iv) ``I am leaving for New Mexico on Wednesday.`` -- an explanation for why I cannot accept your invitation for dinner that night. v) ``I see that you are on time.`` -- an ironic comment on your punctuality. vi) ``I am expecting him to call at any time.`` -- my explanation in response to your curious look as to why I am pacing by the phone. vii) ``I am six feet tall.`` -- an answer to your question of how tall I am. This is a report on my body. There is a something which measures six feet in length. But unless I am my body, the referent is not the I which is of interest.

Notice how readily a substitution can be found for these sentences which does not include the word ``I``: i) ``There`s a light.`` ii) ``Stop doing that.`` iii)``Did you here something?`` The point is that ``I`` is not necessarily involved in communicating the meaning of many of these sentences.

The relevance of examining these sentences is that one may see that their actual meaning is determined without checking the referent to an I or even without the word ``I`` being involved. The exercise helps break the hold that the referent theory of meaning has upon us when doing philosophy. The referent for ``I,`` one thinks, must be the conscious stuff of a person -- of myself. I, that is my consciousness, holds a pain or a sight or sound or belief, etc. But one need not understand I in this way.

Here is another productive exercise: `` `I` is not the name of a person, nor `here` of a place . . . But they are connected with names. Names are explained by means of them. It is also characteristic of physics not to use these words.`` (P.I. #410) ``I`` is not a name; ``Larry`` is a name. ``Larry hurt his toe.`` ``Larry is six feet tall.`` ``Larry sees the importance of voting for the tax abatement.`` As ``I`` can be substituted in place of ``Larry`` in these and like sentences, one might suppose that ``I`` was a name. It is certainly connected to a name for that reason. I, of course, am not Larry in these sentences. If I were Larry, I would not call myself ``Larry`` in such sentences. That fact, I take it, shows that there is something odd about regarding ``I`` as just another name for ``Larry.`` If ``Larry`` were short for ``Laroque`` and ``Rock`` was one of Larry`s names, then ``Rock`` would substitute everywhere for ``Larry.`` So ``Rock`` is a name unlike ``I.``

Names are explained, Wittgenstein says, by means the words ``I,`` and I take it, ``he,`` ``she,`` and ``you`` the personal pronouns. Of Larry -- ``He is six feet tall and works for the Post Office.`` And if I am Larry, then ``I am six feet tall and I work for the Post Office.``

What is productive about this exercise? If one understands that ``I`` may look like a name and be connected with names without being a name, then one need not look for the thing which ``I`` names. The ``I`` in ``I am six feet tall`` is not a name, and so need not seem so elusive. By contrast, if ``I`` is thought of as a name, the ``I`` in such sentences and others becomes a puzzle. If I am not my body, which is six feet tall, then what ``I`` names in that sentence eludes us. Something should be there, but is not. The only thing around which is six feet tall is this body. Under the picture that ``I`` is a name, the sentence ``I am six feet tall`` points to a six foot body as the meaning of the word. But we resist this by countering: ``I am not my body.`` It is odd, is it not, to think of ``I`` as the name of my body? I do not give a name to my body as I would my dog. It is not as if it would make sense to say: ``I call my body `Larry`.`` But if one no longer thinks of the ``I`` in ``I am six feet tall`` as a name, then we do not seek the elusive referent in a body. And if the ``I`` in ``I see the importance of . . . `` is not a name, then, again, the referent need not be sought in consciousness. It is likewise odd, is it not, to separate out my consciousness (What is that?) from my body and to give it a name, as if it were something apart from myself? It is not as if it would make sense to say: ``I call my consciousness `Larry`.`` It sounds as if there are two or three things here: i) the I who names things and ii) the one or two things (body and/or consciousness) named by ``I.`` And how could I distinguish the consciousness which I have named ``Larry`` from any other consciousness? Would it not be alike with any other consciousness? How could one distinguish between consciousnesses? Again, if we no longer think of ``I`` as a name, then we no longer seek the elusive referent in elusive consciousness.

So too, is it not odd that one would call his own bundle of neutral middle stuff activities ``I``? It is not as if it would make sense to say: ``I call my thoughts, emotions, pains `I`.`` Who calls them ``I``? Again, there appear to be two ``I`` s here: i) the I who does the calling, and ii) the bundle of thoughts, emotions, and pains known as ``I.`` ``I call my thoughts `Larry`.`` And do I distinguish thoughts and pains by other names or do I distinguish my bundle of thoughts and pains from someone else`s by means of proper names? ``This set is `Larry` and that set is Roberta`.`` Here is patent nonsense emerging from disguised nonsense.

Cook has had access to these and similar exercises in Wittgenstein`s writings. Apparently they have not kept him from associating a referent with ``I,`` -- not kept him from claiming, in spite of all Wittgenstein`s effort to show the misunderstandings of metaphysics, that Wittgenstein nevertheless has a metaphysics. Wittgenstein`s exercises, such as the above remarks on the grammar of ``I,`` aim at bringing words back from their philosophical use to their ordinary use. Wittgenstein gets us to see what has gone wrong in our philosophical thinking about ``I`` by reminding us that in its ordinary use, ``I`` does not name an object. When the use shows us the meaning, the mental referent disappears as the meaning. This sort of corrective exercise would be aimed at one who, in looking at some word or expression, is mislead to look for the existence of some entity. But Cook has not done this. He has not come to his claim that Wittgenstein holds a metaphysics by misreading the use of ``I`` or other grammar. Nor does Cook believe that Wittgenstein has slid into his metaphysics by failing to command a clear view of language. (Cook does not believe that Wittgenstein is even aware that he has a metaphysics.) Cook, rather, came to his interpretation of Wittgenstein by trying to explain Wittgenstein`s philosophy. Through trying to make various passages consistent and through trying to show what views follow from Wittgenstein`s rejection of dualism and materialism, he, Cook, arrived at his conclusion that Wittgenstein held the metaphysical view ``neutral monism.``

Cook was not led into this view then by the misreading of language. He will not be led out of it very easily then by grammatical reminders. ``I is not a name,`` probably will not help. Cook seems to think that it is Wittgenstein who should have followed his own advice about attending to ordinary language. Perhaps it is Wittgenstein, according to Cook, who should not have associated the middle stuff phenomena with ``I.`` Is it he Cook, according to Cook, who is the real ordinary language philosopher, and Wittgenstein who has failed to attend to ordinary language? But then Cook would be subject to his own critique of Wittgenstein. What is there about Cook`s holding up ordinary language usage as a standard for meaning that would remove it from Cook`s own critique that this amounts to ``neutral monism``? I do not understand. It is all too removed from the way Wittgenstein seeks and holds insights into language and philosophy.

Cook never takes a passage from Wittgenstein and works out its particular applications. He does not attempt to work through the hints, leads, and exercises. He has not attempted to apply the insights which Wittgenstein brings to philosophy. In such an application one may begin to understand Wittgenstein who does not write in the direct style that other philosophers do. Wittgenstein was not attempting to solve philosophical problems but to dissolve them. He was not putting and answering questions, but rejecting questions. He was not offering another theory, but trying to say at last what has gone wrong with offering theories. He was trying to reject the methods and thought patterns of science as those appropriate for philosophy -- trying to show that and how philosophy was unlike science. He believed that his contribution to philosophy was that he had discovered a method. In finding Wittgenstein`s theories of neutral monism and phenomenalism, Cook looses track of the techniques of attacking philosophical theories which Wittgenstein devises. In looking for Wittgenstein`s theories, Cook has missed the heart of what Wittgenstein was trying to do. He has fundamentally misunderstood the nature of Wittgenstein`s work. He looked for theories where there were none, and he found them.

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